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While military governments have often been a tradition in many 
Latin American countries. a relatively small and stable amount of 
national resources is traditionally allocated to national defense. 
Most of the recent studies on the determinants of defense in this 
region of the world have employed data only through the mid-
l 980s. Since then sweeping economic and political changes have 
taken place especially in Latin America. This paper examines the 
factors which have influenced Latin American defense alloca-
tions for fifteen countries in the 1980s to the mid- l 990s. We 
suggest that a long-run relationship exists between defense ex-
penditures and other variables such as GNP and employ a tech-
nique to decompose year to year movements in the defense bur-
den into two components: the component associated with short-
run factors and the component associated with correcting the 
deviation in the defense burden from the long-run pattern. Fac-
tors such as the military·s influence. and changes in regional 
military expenditures are examined. Our results suggest that for 
most of the fifteen countries a high proportion of the defense 
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burden can be explained by a relatively small number of vari-
ables. For six countries, no long-run trend was identified and 
defense expenditures are determined by short-run shocks. For the 
other nine countries, equilibrating corrections are made to the 
defense budget in response to short-run shocks. 
Introduction 
ill 
Despite a tradition of military governments in many Latin American 1 
countries, a relatively small, yet stable, portion of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is allocated to defense: the defense burden has remained below 2 
percent since I 970. and for most of the time was at least half this amount. z 
On the other hand similar defense burdens for all developing countries fell 
from between 6 and 7 percent in the early I 970s to less than 3 percent in I 995. 
Because of the defense burden stability, previous studies examining the 
determinants of defense spending pointed out that economic factors were 
often the major determinants and could dominate geo-political factors in 
determining defense burdens. In other words, attempts to forecast defense 
expenditures should pay serious attention to include economic factors. 
Most of the recent studies only employed data through the mid- l 980s. 
Sweeping economic and political changes have since taken place, and 
especially in Latin America. Concomitantly, several new statistical tech-
niques have been developed with the potential to better identify the dynamics 
of defense expenditure determinants. This paper uses the procedure of co-
integration analysis to examine the factors which influenced Latin American 
defense allocations in the 1980s to the mid- I 990s. Specifically we test to see 
whether the determinants have changed over time, and whether a common 
pattern exists across all countries- or have national experiences been so 
varied that no such pattern can be identified. 
Review of Some Recent Studies 
Although Hill noted that "the military spending level of any nation is 
likely to be a product of a number of separate forces," 3 (such as arms races. 
military alliances, military aid, the form of government, and the like),J 
much of the recent research has focused specifically on the role of economic 
variables. Westing5 pointed out the correlation between increases in military 
expenditures and increases in wealth. Treddenick concluded that "recent 
large increases in Canadian defense expenditures have been influenced more 
by economic than by security considerations. "6 Maize ls and Nissanke7 found 
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the availability of foreign exchange (to purchase arms). relations with power 
blocs and the need by the ruling elite to repress any internal opposition to be 
important determinants. Harriss examined five ASE.AJ.\f countries and found 
that domestic economic conditions (especially government revenue) exert an 
important influence on defense levels. In the same year, Looney 9 found that 
allocations to defense and non-defense sectors often depended on whether or 
not the country was an arms producer. Looney and Frederiksen 10 found that 
a large proportion of the variability in Latin American military expenditures 
was explained by economic variables such as the overall GDP constraint 
(especially in Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina) and fiscal 
funding variables (primarily government expenditures and government 
revenues). However, no one model was preferred overall. and attempts to 
forecasts defense spending were quite limited. Verifying the Harris study, 
Looney and Frederiksen 11 expanded the sample to six ASEAN countries in 
1990 and employed distributed lag functions in their regression analysis. 
Interestingly, Indonesia's defense patterns seemed to be influenced by 
expectations of future oil revenues. Six years later. Looney and Frederiksen 12 
examined budgetary patterns in the Middle East and the Mediterranean 
region and found defense shares were a function of (a) expected and 
unexpected (transitory) government deficits or surpluses, and (b) expected 
and unexpected defense expenditures. Once again. no pattern emerged across 
all countries reflecting different national priorities. In addition, defense and 
socio-economic tradeoffs varied widely among countries. 
"' Recent Latin American Defense Sperling Patterns 
f\ 
Had we used our 1988 model to forecast Latin American defense 
expenditures for the 1980s and 1990s. we would have predicted lower 
defense expenditures. In fact the level rose for most countries. In this section 
we suggest three alternative explanations for the observed increase in the 
military burden in this later time period- budgetary inertia, residual military 
influence, and regional/internal conflict. 
While a rising military burden is not. per se, inconsistent with our model, 
it would require a rather fortuitous set of circumstances: a distributed lag 
function 13 describing a budgetary inertia whereby military reductions 
respond very slowly to a declining resource base. Since the military's share 
of the central budget (as opposed to GDP) declined in the 1980s, this 
approach would also require a set of budget priorities where the defense 
budgets contracts at a faster rate than several of the other main government 
programs. Hicks and Kubisch 14 found that in countries where real govern-
)";-'~Ni),.,., 
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ment expenditures declined the defense sector was more vulnerable to cuts 
than for example was the social sector. 
In addition to budgetary inertia, two circumstances occurred in the 
1980s which had not been present earlier: constrained economic growth and 
also civilian governments replacing military regimes. These two factors led 
Franko 15 to suggest a theory of "residual military influence" whereby 
military establishments in Latin America exerted enough influence so that 
military budgets were at least maintained during either democratic transi-
tion, economic stagnation, or both. This residual influence could explain the 
rising defense burden during the 1980s but does not explain the fall in 
defense's share of the national budget. However, one might argue that the 
defense cuts might have been even greater given no residual military 
influence. 
Furthermore, many countries, especially in Central America, were 
facing internal conflicts or potential regional threats (or both) which would 
argue for maintaining or even expanding military expenditures. This 
internal or external threat might account for a substantial part of the rise in 
the armed forces and arms imports in the early 1980s. 
It is difficult to specify the mechanism by which these three factors, 
either individually or jointly, influenced defense expenditures in Latin 
America. The military/civilian regime cycle could easily overlap with the 
growth/austerity cycle. Furthermore, as other authors have pointed out, lag 
structure specification is difficult between, say, a change in GDP and the 
resulting budget adjustment (in defense or other sector). Incorporating these 
effects is made harder as all three factors may have subtle multi-period 
impacts rather than a one-time impact on the budget. 
An Alternative Methodology 
Given that these n'lechanisms described above may or may not work 
independently, assigning probable causes for observed variability in re-
gional patterns in defense spending has been quite elusive. Available 
aggregate data provide little understanding of the budgetary process at work j 
, Cpolitical factors, budgetary or other economic resource considerations, and 
,/ internal or external threat considerations could easily account for the 
,.,,. observed differences in a region such as Latin America. 
If we are to propose that a long-run relationship exists between defense 
expenditures and some other measure, a methodology must be used to 
overcome problems of spurious correlation common to many previous 
studies cited above. Large percentages of defense burden variability (as a 
-,.., ~ . .: 
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percent of the total variation) 16 being "explained" might well reflect the use 
of time series data where often the variables are correlated with time itself. 
The model estimates are often spurious and fail to indicate or uncover any 
economic relationship. To avoid this issue some researchers have suggested 
that the first differences between data values be used instead of the levels 
themselves. 17 
This paper adopts the cointegration and error correction modeling 
(ECM) originally developed by Granger18 and extended by Engle and 
Granger. 19 Briefly, error correction modeling can identify long run equilib-
rium patterns among time series data, such as GDP, government expendi-
tures, defense burdens and the like. As Figure l indicates, in many of the 
Latin American countries the defense burden (defense expenditures as a 
percent of GDP) appears to be extremely stable in the long-run at a level of 
2-3%. However. short-run recessions, spurts of growth in GDP, or other 
factors such as a regional arms race or a shift to civilian government may at 
times disturb this~ . 
I:ig11 'I: I g , i e tw:relong-run relationship. If. in a statistical sense. there 
is some form of equilibrating relationship in the long-run (where for 
example the 2-3% in the case of Latin America is restored), the ECM model 
will identify the equilibrating pattern by decomposing year to ye.ar move-
ments in the defense burden into two components: (a) a component 
associated with the shorter-run factors and (b) the component associated with 
correcting the deviation from the established pattern. The advantage of this 
approach (over normal multiple regression analysis) is that spurious correla-
tions (often associated with regression analysis of time series data) are avoided. 
Another advantage of the technique is that is provides the researcher some 
insight as to how defense budgets adjust over time - almost immediately or 
over a period of years-to restore the long-term equilibrium relationships. 
Essentially, error correction is the way each country alters its defense 
spending to return to the long-run stability of its defense burden. So if the 
defense burden were to"gradually rise above the target level -dJor example 
GDP declines induced by a recession - defense spending would decline 
enough to restore the percent balance between defense and GDP. Similarly, 
other variables such as changes in the military's influence over policy, or 
increased regional military expenditures may also form long-run relation-
ships with defense. and can adjust in the short-term to a disequilibrium in the 
long-run relationship. Thus they can be thought of as long-run "forcing" 
variables explaining defense spending allocations by central governments. 
The ECM procedure has recently been used successfully by Looney20 to 
explain changes in defense expenditures in Pakistan as a result of short-run 
disequilibria. 
;-,.. .. <~ ,_ .. _., 
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Figure I 
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Military Intervention Index 
A key element is to recognize the military' s influence over the budget 
and to examine whether or not this influence has remained stable. While no 
simple measure (civilian regime versus military regime) or comprehensive 
non-judgmental measure exists, Putnam21 developed a proxy measure called 
the military intervention index (MI!). The MU was recently updated by 
Dix.:! Annually. each country is scored to reflect the "degree of military 
intervention."13 A score of zero indicates an apolitical military; a score of 
three indicates a strong military role where civilians are supplicants of the 
military. Table l shows the MII for 15 Latin American countries between 
l 970 and l 997_:4 zs For inclusion in the table, the country must have (a) been 
in the original Dix sample and (b) also have a change in the MII in the time 
period (a necessary requirement of the model). Thus countries such as 
Nicaragua, Colombia and Mexico were excluded since they did not meet the 
second criteria. 
The MII and three broad defense measures (the defense burden, the share 
of arms imports to total imports, and armed forces per 1000 population) are 
compared in Figure l. As can be seen, the MII peaked in the mid and late 
1970s and has gradually declined since then. While all defense measures 
generally increased to the mid- l 980s and then declined. the arms importS 
variable seems to coincide with the life cycles of various major weapons 
systems-approximately 15-20 years. 16 As these systems reach block 
obsolescence. modification or modem replacement becomes6)requirement 
and implies a funding requirement. Although none of the variables show a 
one-to-one relationship. ----------
(T•b ''" I ~ filireq· fer ,.. '"eriee (HI) Seeres in be ?the frequent short-run 
changes in the defense burden suggests that other factors, and not just 
military influence. are at work in the budget process. If the military influence 
factor is operative. it is an equilibration process whose influence is felt over 
a fairly long time and at different strengths each year. 
Model Construction 
The primary purpose of the model is to explain changes in defense 
expenditures over time. The model must separate the short-run shocks 
(influences) on defense spending (such as changes in GDP or a regime 
change in a neighbor country) from changes in defense spending so a long-
run equilibrium, or balance, in the defense burden can be restored-the error 
correction.27 The model that is estimated specifies that real defense expen-
Table I 
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ditures in a country at a point in time will be influenced by internal and 
external factors. The internal factors we include are (a) the lagged defense 
expenditure values1s to capture the error (i.e. long-run) correction, (b) the 
resource base (changes in the country's real GNP and its population), and (c) 
the Mii. Regional defense spending is included as an external factor since 
we assume that changes in regional militarization could well induce an 
almost immediate change in a country's defense spending.:9 JO 
The Results 
The model was estimated for each country using economic data from the 
World Bank31 and military data from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency32 and the results appear in summary form in Table 2.33 The 
table shows the major underlying determinants-military influence, domes-
tic resources. and regional considerations.;; ------
~Table 2 CharaeEeFisti&s if Hilittu 1 .\UocalioAs-iR Aere:'and the streng;th 
J , -
of each variable for all 15 countries. The countries have been divided into 
four groups corresponding to the strength of the variables. The strength of 
the determinant - strong (S). medium (M) or weak (W)-reflects the value 
of the 't' coefficient for each variable which indicates whether the estimated 
coefficient is statistically different from zero. 
The time period for adjustments in defense spending is shown as either 
long-run or short-run. If the error correction term was not statistically 
significant from zero. the defense spending equilibration process is short-
run. Defense spending reacts only to changes in the independent variables 
-the determinants. In other words, the country does not try to maintain a 
target level for the defense burden. If, on the other hand, the error correction 
term was found to be statistically different from zero. we can conclude 
countries alter defense spending to restore a long-run target of military 
spending as a percent ~f GDP. the military balance. 
For the first group of countries-Argentina. Guatemala. and Panama-
the model indicates that the military has a significant influence on allocations 
to defense. The military influence dominated any regional militarization 
concern which was important to some degree in all three countries. 
Argentina reacted to Brazilian military expenditures. while Guatemala and 
Panama reacted to overall Central American defense spending patterns. The 
domestic resource base appeared to be only important in Panama. In the case 
of Argentina. since the country's resource base has had little measurable 
effect on defense spending, defense expenditures have fallen sharply with the 
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out the region. In Argentina. defense expenditures change so that a long-run 
balance is reestablished between defense and the military influence and 
regional (Brazilian) defense expenditures. No such long-term equilibration 
process exists for Guatemala or Panama. 
The domestic resource base for Brazil and Paraguay is the major 
determinant of defense spending, and especially the arms import component. 
Brazil reacts to changes in Argentinean defense spending by changing the size 
of its armed forces. In both countries. defense spending adjusts to reestablish 
a long-run balance with all three determinants. These adjustments are at le:ist 
consistent with the budgetary inertia model described above. 
Defense budgets in Ecuador, Honduras and El Salvador are primarily 
affected by changes in regional defense spending patterns. In all cases. this 
was specified as the size of regional armed forces. Domestic resource 
constraints play a lesser role, and any residual military influence is weak. 
Changes in defense expenditures appear to be merely a reaction to changes 
in the region· s military patterns rather than an attempt to maintain a long 
term balance. 
Multiple determinants affect defense spending in the final group of 
countries and no one factor is dominant Generally, defense budgets are 
moderately affected by their respective resource bases, with regional 
considerations generally less important. The residual military influence was 
moderate in Chile and Peru. and weak in Venezuela and Haiti. Interestingly. 
with the exception of Chile. there appears to be long-term balance between 
defense expenditures and the underlying determinants. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has expanded the discussion on the determinants of defense 
spending for fifteen Latin American countries. While previous studies 
identified the importam role of economic factors in determining defense 
budgets, in our opinion no study if used for forecasting purposes would have 
been very successful. We suggest three alternative explanations for part of 
the defense spending differences in the region: budgetary inertia, a residual 
military influence, and regional or internal conflicts. A model is developed 
to identify changes in defense budgets as either (a) reactions to short-term 
shocks or (b) attempts by individual governments to reestablish some sort of 
long-run balance between defense spending and.some measure of economic 
activity, military influence, or regional military activity. 
Our results suggest that in a· majority of cases a high proportion of 
national budget allocations to defense can be explained by a relatively small 
Looney & Frcdenkscn ·131 
number of variables. Although our earlier paper on Latin America did not 
test for the effect of military influence or regional militatizati.on, the lower 
proportion of total defense expenditures accounted for by economic factors 
seems to suggest that the two may well have increased in importance in recent 
years. However, a military influence and/or .a regional effect makes 
generalizations or forecasts of defense expenditures difficult. The method-
ology separates countries whose defense budgets only react to short-term 
shocks (such as changes in regional military spending) from countries whose 
defense budgets are changed to maintain a long-run target level. For nine 
countries, the latter exists: equilibrating corrections are made to the defense 
budget in response to short-term shocks. In the remaining six countries, no 
long-run trend target was identified; defense expenditures are determined by 
short-run shocks only. 
In terms of future research. the predominance of countries experiencing 
long-term error corrections in their defense budgets suggests that this 
methodology could produce reliable forecasts of defense budgets. First 
however, feedback effects from defense allocations to regional patterns must 
be established. In addition. individual country explanations could no doubt 
be improved with the inclusion of country specific variables such as civil 
wars and the like. Furthermore, this paper has focused on target levels of the 
military balance (military expenditures as a percent of GDP). We suggest 
that similar analyses can be done using target levels and error correction for 
either armed forces per capita. or the level of arms imports as a percent of 
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